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In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both resolves some 
of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described there and shows how those 
remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks besides, as they help in the 
structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what is clearer and more knowable to 
us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, that nature exists and that natural things 
change—his basic starting-point for natural science. This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of 
“immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks must be further analyzed in terms of principles 
(archai) and then causes (aitia) over the course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about 
the natural world.1 Such an analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition (horismos) of nature not 
initially available from the starting-point just mentioned (i.e., it is in need of further analysis), and 
which is clearer by nature.2 It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding 
Aristotle’s original intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor 
how the Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to 
show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology for 




In 1.1 of the Physics, Aristotle ostensibly gives us his general framework for a natural 
science. There he says that knowledge concerning nature (episteme peri phuseos) (and indeed 
all knowledge) involves “grasp of” or “acquaintance with” its (i) “causes” (aitia), its (ii) “first 
                                                          
1 An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is 
that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of 
revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra 
the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer 
by nature. 
2 Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source (arche) and 
cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that 
is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-22). 
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principles” (archas protas) and its (iii) “elements” (stoicheia) (184a10-16).3 Although 
“elements” comes to be used largely synonymously with “principles” in the succeeding 
discussion of books 1 and 2 of the Physics,4 the distinction between principles (archai) and 
causes (aitia, aitiai) is a crucial one, and seems to play a predominant role in the ordering 
and subject matter of the two books.   
 But, after these opening lines, nearly everything that Aristotle says in the rest of 1.1 
is controversial, and has proven notoriously difficult for interpreters of Aristotle’s scientific 
methodology. Aristotle goes on to say:  
The natural course is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us, to what is more 
knowable and clear by nature; for the two are not the same (ou gar tauta hemin te gnorima kai haplos).  
Hence we must start thus with things which are less clear by nature, but clearer to us, and move on to 
things which are by nature clearer and more knowable (184a15-25, my emphasis).5 
Charlton finds this passage and the ones that directly follow it particularly obscure 
and “cryptic,” considering especially how they seemingly contradict what Aristotle has to 
say in other formulations of his methodology throughout the corpus—in particular, De anima 
and the Posterior Analytics—and wonders about their relation to the Physics as a whole.6 
Ross too notes the apparent discrepancies between what is said in Physics 1 and what we find 
in other of Aristotle’s works, and admits that Aristotle’s “precise method” for a single method 
of a science of nature is unclear in 1.1. He discusses how Aristotle’s extremely compressed 
prose here even led Pacius to hypothesize that in fact three different distinct methods for 
natural science are described in these few opening lines.7 
And the passage does raise a few natural questions readily apparent to us, independent 
of previous commentators’ confusion. The first is: What does Aristotle think he identifies as 
“what is clearer and more knowable to us” and “what is more knowable and clear by nature” 
                                                          
3 Listed in order of presentation in Phys. 1.1. 
4 Though in other works it seems as though the stoicheia have an importantly different role to play: 
e.g., Metaphysics A and elsewhere. 
5 Charlton translation, revised, throughout. 
6 Charlton 51-53. 
7 See Ross 456-8.  The methods were the so-called 1) methodus resolutiva a toto integrato ad partes 
integrantes, 2) methodus divisiva ab universalibus et a notioribus secundum sensum ad particularia, 
and 3) methodus definitiva a nomine ad definitionem. 
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in following discussions within Physics 1 and 2? And then next: does Aristotle, over the 
course of books 1 and 2 of the Physics, follow his own program? Or are these general 
remarks, though intriguing in their own right, not especially pertinent to the main action of 
the treatise (or treatises)?8  And finally, our the overarching question: what are we to make 
of these remarks, especially when they have such a place of prominence in the first chapter 
of Aristotle’s principal work on a natural science?   
 
2. General Outline of the Interpretation 
 
In this essay I will argue for an interpretation of the remarks of Physics 1.1 that both 
resolves some of the confusion surrounding the precise nature of methodology described 
there and shows how those remarks at 184a15-25 serve as important programmatic remarks 
besides, as they help in the structuring of books 1 and 2 of the Physics. I will argue that “what 
is clearer and more knowable to us” is what Aristotle goes on to describe in 1.2—namely, 
that nature exists and that natural things change—his basic starting-point for natural science. 
This, I shall hope to show, is the kind of “immediate” sense datum which Aristotle thinks 
must be further analyzed in terms of principles (archai) and then causes (aitia) over the 
course of Physics books 1 and 2 to lead to knowledge about the natural world.9 Such an 
analysis arrives at, as I shall show, a definition (horismos) of nature not initially available 
                                                          
8 I allude to the conclusion of some that Physics 1 perhaps was a standalone treatise with the title peri 
archon and was appended to the separate Physics only later by Aristotle (or perhaps another editor in 
the Lyceum) (see Ross 1-6). Another tradition within antiquity was to establish a unity between 
Physics books 1 and 2 (again, Ross 1-6). Themistius, a Byzantine paraphraser of Aristotle’s Physics 
well-regarded in the Middle Ages, certainly thought so (see Themistius On Aristotle’s Physics 1-3, 
35.2-3). My essay then broadly fits within this latter “unitarian” tradition.  In this essay I won’t be 
addressing this question head-on, though I will mention it in a few instances when it suits my purpose.  
I shall hope to show that my reading is unaffected either way. 
9 An interesting consequence of this, and one which I shall not pursue in this paper at any length, is 
that the progression from what is clearer to us and what is clearer by nature is by necessity a form of 
revision: i.e., the Physics should not be seen as a work validating the “starting-point” of 1.2 contra 
the monists, but a work which gradually builds to the language of matter and form as what is clearer 
by nature. 
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from the starting-point just mentioned (i.e., it is in need of further analysis), and which is 
clearer by nature.10   
Here is a brief summary of the view I argue for here: on my reading, the main thread 
of argument in Physics books 1 and 2 is dominated by the methodology discussed in Physics 
1.1 itself, and so follows the general structure demanded by Aristotle’s insistence that 
knowledge results from a definition (horismos) which takes a universal/whole (katholou, 
holon), more knowable and more clear to us by perception (ten aisthesin), and divides it 
(diairei) by means of principles (archai) into particulars which are clearer and more 
knowable by nature (phusei). This structure demands that we start with a universal and that 
we get clear on the principles needed to divide this universal. This of course is borne out in 
the actual structure of Physics 1 and 2. The definition comes later at 2.1, after principles for 
the definition have been adequately discussed and numbered. 
It is not my aim here to resolve longstanding debates surrounding Aristotle’s original 
intent in the ordering and composition of the first two books of the Physics, nor how the 
Physics is meant to fit into the Aristotelian corpus taken as a coherent whole, but rather to 
show that the first two books of the Physics, as they stand, fit with the picture of methodology 
presented to us in 1.1, motivating what I call the “physical” approach to Aristotle’s Physics—




I shall argue for the abovementioned points following this order. First, I will give an 
exposition of the main passages in question, viz., Physics 1.1, and will begin to do some of 
the work of situating it within the context of Physics 1 and 2 as a whole. In the immediately 
succeeding section I will introduce and motivate some influential contemporary approaches 
to the opening remarks of 1.1 and the opposed so-called “dialectical” and “scientific” 
readings of said remarks. I will then sketch how these approaches suggest we read the Physics 
as a whole.  Contrary to both of these approaches, I shall attempt to make sense of the opening 
                                                          
10 Viz., what we find at the beginning of 2.1: “this suggests that nature is a sort of source (arche) and 
cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to which it belongs primarily of itself, that 
is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-22). 
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of book 1 without the use of methodological apparatuses from other places in the Aristotelian 
corpus. I shall hope to show that this feature of my approach is not only distinctive, but 
attractive. In the third and most important section of my essay, I shall argue for why my 
approach is the correct one, as it not only makes better sense of the action of the first two 
books as a whole, but also gives us a far better explanation of some of the seemingly cryptic 
comments we find in 1.1 (namely, what I had reason to mention in the introduction). 
 
4. Examining Physics 1.1-2: Aristotle on Episteme regarding Phusis 
 
I think it will be of some use if I begin our discussion by reproducing the main passage 
in question which comes at the very beginning of the Physics: 
In all disciplines in which there is a systematic knowledge of things with principles, causes, or 
elements, it arises from a grasp of those: we think we have knowledge of a thing when we have found 
its primary causes and principles, and followed it back to its elements. Clearly, then, systematic 
knowledge of nature must start with an attempt to settle questions about principles. The natural course 
is to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us, to what is more knowable and clear by 
nature; for the two are not the same. Hence we must start thus with things which are less clear by 
nature, but clearer to us, and move on to things which are by nature clearer and more knowable. The 
things which are in the first instance clear and plain to us are rather those which are compounded. It 
is only later, through an analysis of these, that we come to know elements and principles (184a10-
25).   
As I said in my introduction, Aristotle’s overall aim with respect to his 
methodological comments here is far from clear.  But it will be useful to give a quick rundown 
of the less obscure parts of the passage.11   
Principles (archai), as the word suggests, are prior to anything else in our science of 
nature, and are the fundamentals out of which explanatorily posterior causes (aitia, 
“explanations,” “reasons”) are developed. As we go on to see in 1.2, principles must be 
principles of something—that is, they must constitute other things so they are not themselves 
able to have principles—and they must either be one or many (184b14-15). Aristotle, as we 
shall see, comes down resolutely on the side of their being multiple, though that it is not 
immediately at hand. Causes (aitia), on the other hand, are other less prior modes of 
explanation which (it seems) arise out of the principles.  In 2.3 they are also revealed to be 
                                                          
11 Though our discussion here is solely meant as an introduction and is by no means exhaustive. 
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multiple—Aristotle’s famous four causes—but that of course is an observation far removed 
from the reflections of 1.1. At this point it only matters that causes follow principles in a 
systematic knowledge of nature. 
Now, as I said in the introduction, it is very tempting, and indeed plausible, to take 
the main purpose of 1.1 to be setting up the ordering of books 1 and 2, with book 1 
functioning as an investigation into the number and nature of principles for a natural science 
and book 2 continuing the order of explanation into the number and nature of the natural 
causes.12 Moreover, the topic seems to be picked up somewhat straightforwardly later in the 
Physics (2.3, 194b15-25). This, I think, is good as far as it goes. But it leaves the even more 
cryptic statements that follow Aristotle’s quick summary discussion of principles, causes, 
and elements in 1.1 unexplained. 
 This starts with Aristotle’s recommendation that we begin our study of natural science 
with what Charlton translates as the “natural course” (lit., pephuke, a verbal form) at 184a16. 
This approach is “to proceed from what is clearer and more knowable to us, to what is more 
knowable and clear by nature; for the two are not the same”. While this may at first seem 
intuitively true—science, we think, somehow orders or explains immediately clear 
perceptions by explanations in mathematical or technical terminology not immediately clear 
to us, and proceeds by steps to things which are somehow clearer to the way things really 
are, or, perhaps, how they stand as objective matters of fact—the sentiment is less clearly 
understood with respect to what Aristotle goes on to do in the succeeding sections of the 
Physics. In fact, it is not immediately clear just what Aristotle thinks is the sort of thing that 
is clear to us and the sort that is, by contrast, more knowable by nature. 
And this is further complicated by how Aristotle concludes Phys. 1.1, where the 
progression from what is clearer to us to what is clearer by nature is even more obscure.  
Aristotle writes:  
That is why we should proceed from the universal (katholou) to the particular (hekasta). It is the 
whole (holon) which is more knowable by perception (kata ten aisthesin), and the universal is a sort 
of whole: it embraces many things as parts. Words stand in a somewhat similar relationship to 
                                                          
12 See esp. 2.1-3 and apparent back references to the aims and goals of 1.1.  Indeed, this seems to be 
how Simplicius reads the connection between books 1 and 2.  He says in his introduction to On 
Aristotle’s Physics 2 that the first book of the Physics “after outlining and examining the doctrines of 
the natural scientists, proceeded to reveal the elemental principles,” and that the second book 
expounds on the causes, which are more numerous and not themselves “elemental” (259.1-20).  
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accounts. A word like ‘circle’ indicates a whole indiscriminately, whereas the definition of a circle 
divides it into particulars. And little children at first call all men father and all women mother, only 
later coming to discriminate each of them. (184a23-184b13) 
What is perhaps most striking in this passage is Aristotle’s insistence that it is with 
the universal that we ought to begin our account of the natural world rather than the 
particular, and the immediate implication that the universal is more clear to us and that the 
particular is clearer by nature. What could Aristotle mean here? For we may at first be 
tempted to think that Aristotle has got the order completely turned around—science, we think, 
generally works from particulars to generalized universals, not the other way around. That, 
we might think, sounds like a hopeless conceptual enterprise—perhaps of interest to the 
philosopher but not to anyone else. That is, we do not, say, begin with universal 
meteorological principles about Earth-like atmospheres to give a prediction of weather 
conditions that might obtain tomorrow in Chicago, but rather work up to better and better 
generalized laws through a combination of careful, accurate observation and interpreted data 
analysis. On such a view, the “universal” follows, and ultimately depends on, interpreted 
particulars. 
 But how could we read this passage more charitably? Just what would it mean for 
Aristotle to say that correct scientific procedure demands starting with universals—which 
are better known to us—to arrive at particulars, which are more clear by nature? Part of the 
strength of my discussion in this essay, I think, is that I am able to provide an answer to this 
question.   
But the text of 1.1 leaves us with a host of interpretive and philosophical questions 
besides: are the things that are immediately clear to us—these “universals”—certain received 
views, endoxa?  Or are they, rather, things knowable by perception? What would it mean to 
perceive a universal?  Again: Are the things more knowable by nature arrived at by a sort of 
a priori, conceptual, dialectical analysis, or by a method more familiarly “scientific” to us—
proceeding from experience to generalization? In any case, how we choose to answer these 
questions will make a significant impact on how we view Aristotle’s scientific methodology 
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5. ‘Dialectical’ and ‘scientific’ approaches to Physics 1.1  
 
In recent approaches to Aristotle’s methodology in the Physics, two broad interpretive 
camps have arisen, each hoping to answer just the sort of questions we had reason to ask in 
the previous section.  I shall take as representative of the so-called “dialectical” interpretation 
those along the lines of G.E.L. Owen, Terence Irwin, and William Charlton,13 and as 
representative of the scientific approach an influential essay by Robert Bolton, “Aristotle’s 
Method in Natural Science: Physics I,” where Bolton consciously sets himself against the 
trend toward the “dialectical” approach.14 I shall begin with the dialectical approach and then 
discuss the scientific approach.    
 The dialectical approach is distinguished most of all by its emphasis on the supposed 
tension between Aristotle’s “theory and practice” (to borrow from Owen’s characterization): 
namely, supposed discrepancies between what Aristotle said in the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics were the criteria for correct methodology in any given science, and Aristotle’s 
practice in the Physics, i.e., how Aristotle arrives at the first principles and causes of a natural 
science. For it seems that in the Posterior Analytics we get an account of scientific method 
which describes episteme in terms of a formal-deductive apparatus, not what we might 
normally think of as empirical science, though not altogether different from it (and, 
importantly, what Owen and others think Aristotle does not give us in the Physics). Indeed, 
in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle says that we have scientific knowledge of something 
when we are able to reason from certain incontrovertible and immediately known premises 
to their necessitated conclusions. The conclusions of course are then demonstrative, but, 
avoiding regress, Aristotle says that the “immediately known” premises are themselves 
indemonstrable. In a useful passage, he writes: 
Our own doctrine is that not all knowledge is demonstrative: on the contrary, knowledge of the 
immediate premises is independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this is obvious; for since we 
                                                          
13 Though I shall not discuss them all in depth. For Owen, see his classic article, “Tithenai ta 
phainomena” in Logic, Science, and Dialectic (London and Ithaca, 1962/1986), which I will be 
discussing in the next few pages. For Irwin, who follows in a similar approach, see Aristotle’s First 
Principles (Oxford, 1988), 3.34-37, and, for our purposes, esp. 34.  For Charlton, see his introduction 
to his translation of the first two books of the Physics, especially pages 11 and 15. 
14 Bolton, Robert, “Aristotle’s Method in Natural Science: Physics I.” Aristotle’s Physics: A 
Collection of Essays. Ed. Lindsay Judson. Oxford: Clarendon, 1988. 
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must know the prior premises from which the demonstration is drawn, and since the regress must end 
in immediate truths, those truths must be indemonstrable.) Such, then, is our doctrine, and in addition 
we maintain that besides scientific knowledge there is its source which enables us to recognize the 
definitions. (Pos. An. 1.3, 72b18-24) 
Now just how these premises are immediately known is a matter of some complexity. 
But it seems that in the Prior Analytics we get a convincing picture, one in which they 
ultimately derive from objects of sense perception—ta phainomena: 
It falls to experience to provide the principles of any subject. In astronomy, for instance, it was 
astronomical experience that provided the principles of the science, for it was only when the 
phainomena were adequately grasped that the proofs in astronomy were discovered. And the same is 
true of any art or science whatever. (An. Pr. 1.3, 46a17-22)15 
 Now, to Owen’s reading (and those who follow his lead in interpreting the Physics 
dialectically), Aristotle does nothing of the sort over the course of the Physics. He never 
consistently refers back to a set of canonical phainomena—that is, objects of sense perception 
which are taken to be accurate, representative, or privileged in any important sense—and 
further still he does not even adopt the method of reasoning from sense perceptions at all to 
conclusions somehow contained within such perceptions. Sense data, Owen thinks, play a 
somewhat subordinate role to the main line of argument in the Physics, where the premises 
are instead established by “considering how we ordinarily talk,” a method more familiar to 
students of the method of the Topics, i.e., reasoning from the endoxa, “generally-held 
opinions,” to truth (1. 100a18-20).16,17 Owen writes: “<…> the Physics ranks itself not with 
physics, in our sense of the word, but with philosophy.  Its data are not for the most part the 
materials not of natural history but of dialectic, and its problems are accordingly not questions 
                                                          
15 Owen’s translation at the beginning of his “Tithenai ta phainomena,” p. 239. 
16 Using Charlton’s phrase on p. xv.  See also Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik (Göttingen, 1962), 
for extensive discussion on this point (also cited in Charlton xv).  Charlton has a useful list of 
instances of ordinary language data on p. xi: Phys. 192b11-12, 194b33-5, 196a15-16, 199a1. 
17 I won’t have much to say here about the detailed particulars of either Owen or Charlton’s 
characterization of Aristotle’s position as dialectical—or much to say about how it fits with the 
Topics—but I assume the following sketch of the dialectician in the Topics: he reasons from what is 
known to either all or by the wise (but what is not itself provable) to what is true (if he is a philosopher) 
and to what is useful or advantageous (if he is a mere dialectician) (Top. 8. 155b7-10, Charlton xi).  
On the Owenian reading, then, Aristotle is of course not just a dialectician—he is still a philosopher 
seeking the truth via the endoxa—but he is not something of a philosopher-scientist hybrid (i.e., 
someone who reasons from sense perceptions to generalized principles about the natural world). 
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of empirical fact but conceptual puzzles”.18 And in another further formulation of similar 
sentiment Owen cites Mansion: “ [In the Physics] <…> in general everything comes down 
to more or less detailed conceptual analyses – analyses often guided and illustrated by, rather 
than founded upon, empirical data”.19 
 Bolton argues for the nearly opposite conclusion in his “Aristotle’s Method in Natural 
Science: Physics I” and consciously sets himself against the “new orthodoxy” of the 
dialectical interpretation of the Physics.  He is the main proponent of the interpretation I call 
“scientific”, as one of Bolton’s main aims is to show that Aristotle’s method in the Physics 
is one we might ordinarily recognize as scientific, in the normal, Baconian sense. He develops 
his account in part out of an analysis of Physics 1 (which he thinks is underappreciated by 
Owenian interpreters), but with a strong emphasis on the Posterior Analytics as well, for as 
it turns out one of his other main points in the essay is to explain away the apparent tension 
Owen and other dialectical interpreters felt between the Analytics picture of scientific 
knowledge and the practice of the Physics.  Bolton goes so far as to say: “The correspondence 
between the Physics and the Analytics enables us now to draw a general conclusion about the 
method which Aristotle recommends in the Physics for natural science, namely that this 
method is exactly the one he describes in the Posterior Analytics.”20  
 But why does Bolton say this? For one, he thinks that there is actually a strong 
resemblance between what Aristotle says in the Posterior Analytics (esp. 1.1-2, 2.9 and 2.19) 
about scientific method and what Aristotle says in Physics 1.1 and what he goes on to do in 
the succeeding books of the Physics. By not focusing on the supposed discrepancies between 
the two and the supposed Topics-like ordinary linguistic data of the Physics, Bolton is able 
to draw the Posterior Analytics picture of method and that of the Physics much closer and 
seemingly in broad agreement. He points especially to the following passage from Posterior 
Analytics 1.2: 
 We think we understand a thing simpliciter (and not in the sophistic fashion accidentally) 
whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the object is is its 
explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise. <…> If, then, understanding is as we 
                                                          
18 Owen 242. 
19 Mansion in Introduction a la physique aristotelicienne (Louvain 1946), p. 211., quoted in Owen 
1982, p. 240. 
20 Bolton 11. 
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posited, it is necessary for demonstrative understanding in particular to depend on things which are 
true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the 
conclusion (for in this way the principles will also be appropriate to what is being proved). <...> 
Things are prior and more familiar in two ways; for it is not the same to be prior by nature and prior 
in relation to us, nor to be more familiar and more familiar to us. I call prior and more familiar in 
relation to us what is nearer to perception, prior and more familiar simpliciter what is further away. 
(70b9-12, 20-25; 72a1-6) 
What we of course notice here is the language of “what is clearer/nearer to us” and 
“what is clearer/more knowable by nature or further away” which seems to mirror quite 
closely the discussion we have in Physics 1.1 in a striking way, and a similarly striking 
repetition of perception’s important role to play.   
 Bolton also criticizes attempts by Owen and others to characterize the method 
followed in the Physics as dialectic, along the lines of what is discussed in the Topics. For he 
finds the evidence for such a move exceedingly weak. In Topics 8.5, Aristotle does indeed 
say that the dialectician will move from premises which are more intelligible than the 
conclusion, which will be less intelligible (159b8-9, cited in Bolton 12). But this, as Bolton 
points out, is a weaker point than what both the Physics 1.1 passage and the above Posterior 
Analytics passage are discussing. Neither discusses a bare dialectical point—that in a given 
argument one should start with premises simpler than the conclusion that one may convince 
others more easily and effectively—but rather a deeper, substantive philosophical point that 
the correct method in a science of the natural world is to proceed from what is clearer to us 
to what is clearer by nature. 
 But Bolton’s interpretation, of course, is not without drawbacks of its own. One of 
the consequences of Bolton’s insistence on the strong equivalence of the methodologies of 
both the Physics and Posterior Analytics is that when there is a seeming contradiction 
between the two, he often uses the Posterior Analytics to help us reinterpret what is obscure 
or difficult in the Physics. This of course has its merits, but it betrays Bolton’s probable 
underlying suspicion that the order of priority goes from the Posterior Analytics to the 
Physics, and not the other way around. For instance, in Bolton’s discussion of the Physics 
view that we are more directly acquainted with the universal than the particular (which flatly 
contradicts the Posterior Analytics in 1.2 and elsewhere, where we are said to know the 
particulars first), Bolton points to other passages in the Posterior Analytics (namely, 2.8 and 
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2.19) to explain away the tension.21 I wonder, on the contrary, whether a more interesting 
conclusion might be arrived at by looking at the Physics view—namely, that we are more 
acquainted with the universals than particulars at first—by its own lights. 
 
6. The Methodology of Physics 1.1: Understanding the Physics on its own terms 
 
We can now begin our own analysis of Physics 1.1, and explain its place and function 
in Physics 1 and 2.  My reading will be seen to fall squarely within neither of the two previous 
interpretive camps we had reason to discuss in the last section, but adopts something of a 
hybrid stance. As I said before, I take it as a positive feature of my account that it does not 
rely on other things Aristotle has to say about method in other parts of the Aristotelian corpus. 
I of course do not think that such a practice is unwarranted or unhelpful, but I do think that 
understanding the Physics solely on its own terms would be useful for resolving some of the 
puzzles I mentioned at the beginning of this essay. Hence in contrast to the aforementioned 
“scientific” and “dialectical” approaches, I shall hope to advance something like the 
“physical” approach to reading Physics 1.1.   
I shall now present my plan for this section. I will argue that 1.1 does indeed introduce 
the methodology that Aristotle himself will use through books 1 and 2 (and, by implication, 
that he does not covertly revert to the methodologies either of the Topics or Posterior 
Analytics). To do this, I will first have to give a reading of 1.1 and then weigh my reading 
against succeeding discussions within the text of Physics 1 and 2. At the end of this discussion 
I will give a recapitulation of my points and why I think my method ought to be preferred (or 
at least ought to be used as an augment) to either the dialectical or scientific approach to 
Aristotle’s Physics.  
 I shall take it as uncontroversial that the very start of 1.1 (viz., 184a10-16) is fairly 
unambiguous. Principles (archai), as I have said, seem for Aristotle to be the most 
fundamental things available to us in giving an account of anything, and are the basic building 
blocks of systematic knowledge concerning any given subject. I take it as fairly clear that 
they are explanatorily prior to the other two fundamental items Aristotle discusses (namely, 
                                                          
21 See Bolton 10-11. 
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stoicheia and aitia), as Aristotle says it is clear that a systematic analysis begins with a 
discussion about principles (184a16, “delon hoti kai tes peri phuseos epistemes peirateon 
diorisasthai proton ta peri tas archas”). This, I think, is of fundamental importance, however, 
since it guides the argument of the rest of Book 1. Aristotle starts 1.2 immediately with 
conceptual analysis concerning principles. I shall return to causes in a moment after further 
discussion of 1.1. 
 In the passage directly following the first sentence, interpreting what Aristotle means 
becomes considerably more difficult.22 Aristotle says that the correct procedure is to start 
with what is clearer and more knowable to us (gnorimoteron hemin; saphesteron) to those 
things which are clearer (saphestera) and more knowable (gnorimotera) by nature (phusei). 
I take it as fairly plausible to suppose that by more knowable by nature, Aristotle means to 
describe those things which are more in line with fact—with the true, objective state of the 
world. And this, he thinks (not too implausibly), might be far removed from what we are 
ordinarily more aware of.  But what might those objects be? 
 Aristotle goes on to say that the things which are clearer to us are “mixed” or 
“compounded,” or perhaps even “confused” (sunkechumena, 184a22). Aristotle seems to be 
talking about the confused nature of our sense experience or perhaps the compounded, non-
simple conceptual states we often find ourselves in. He then says that the things more 
knowable, the gnorima, come about from these confused things more clear to us only after 
the principles have divided (perhaps “analyzed,” diairousi) them. We of course now see the 
importance of principles for Aristotle’s methodology once again—by their very division of 
the confused things immediate to us, they begin to arrive at things more knowable by 
nature—but we also remain uncertain about just what sort of division Aristotle is talking 
about. Thankfully, this is also built up by Aristotle in the next few sentences, those which 
have been found by most commentators to be most obscure. 
 Aristotle begins at 184a23 with what many have found to be the most jarring part of 
the opening 1.1 discussion. Aristotle says that we must start with the universal (katholou), 
more knowable by perception (ten aisthesin), and arrive at particulars.23 He also means to 
                                                          
22 If the reader would like to consider the passage in conjunction with my explication, I have 
reproduced the lines on pages 4, 5, and 6 of this essay (184a10-184b14). 
23 In direct contradiction with what he says at Pos. An. 1.2, 72a7 and elsewhere. 
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say, then, by direct implication, that the universal (which, as he will go on to say in 24, is a 
kind of “whole”) is that which is clearer and more knowable to us. This many have found to 
be particularly difficult. But it does not seem to be a slip on Aristotle’s part (see similarities 
with 1.7, 190a30-33), and I do not mean here to resolve the tension by appealing to other 
evidence from the Posterior Analytics. So what might Aristotle mean? Indeed, to put the 
question we have been building to in a little clearer form: what does Aristotle mean when he 
says that those things which are clearer and more knowable to us are compounded and 
universal/whole? My answer, which I believe is particularly well evidenced in 1.2, is that the 
universal or whole Aristotle has in mind is the immediate, uninterpreted data of sense 
experience—which, as one might expect, can range from certain “limited” wholes, such as 
genera of animals, to, at broadest level, nature itself. This of course I will be explaining in 
greater detail over the next few pages. 
 In the final few sentences Aristotle tries to fill in this account a little further, but it 
lacks clarity owing to its extreme terseness. I hope my exposition can correct for that. 
Aristotle says at 184b10 that words (onomata) are related to the account (logos) in the same 
way as whole is to particular. Then he says: “a word like ‘circle’ indicates a whole 
indiscriminately, whereas the definition (horismos) of a circle divides it into particulars (ho 
de horismos autou diairei eis ta kath’ hekasta)” (11).  Aristotle means here, I think, that the 
word itself “circle” is something like the uninterpreted whole (more knowable by perception) 
I mentioned in my last paragraph, and that further elements of a definition make it into 
particulars, often of more fundamental natures. For instance, a definition of circle might be 
“a shape whose sides are all equidistant from its center”—taking a compound (a 
sunkechumenon) and reducing it into its simples. 
 Drawing from all this, we may say that whatever the compound (sunkechumenon) is 
in the following discussion in books 1 and 2, it will be a whole that the principles (archai) 
divide into particulars. And it is in 1.2, where Aristotle begins his treatise in earnest after 
introductory remarks, that we start with what is clearer and more knowable to us (a whole) 
in a discussion about nature (peri phuseos) to be later divided by principles (the precise nature 
of which constitutes the subject matter of the entire of book 1). In 1.2, Aristotle says that the 
monists—those who claim that all there is is one and motionless—are not properly speaking 
engaged in discussions about nature. They ignore, in effect, what is immediately clear and 
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more knowable to us (and which Aristotle says later at 2.1 193a2-5 it would be ridiculous to 
try to show), namely, that nature exists and is related to change (1.2, 185a12-14). This, I take 
it, is meant to provide us with the uninterpreted starting-point of Aristotle’s natural science—
the whole and universal that Aristotle describes in 1.1—to be later analyzed and “divided” 
into particulars by the principles (once we have arrived at their nature and number, as we do 
at the end of 1.9). 
 It remains to be said, then, how I think my interpretation of the very beginning of 
book 1 plays a certain ordering role in the course of Physics 1 and 2.  I think 2.1 provides my 
account with particularly strong evidence.   
On my reading, Aristotle says in 1.1 that for us to say we have knowledge about 
nature (peri phuseos), we must begin with principles (first in order of explanation) and get 
clear on what we mean we talk about them, and then use these principles in a definition 
(horismos) to divide the whole into particulars. Book 1, on my interpretation, just is the 
exercise of getting clear on principles for a natural science (about knowledge peri phuseos). 
In this way my interpretation fits with certain traditional interpretations of book 1 as the 
“book about principles” (peri archon).24 I took it as convincing that the “whole” in our case 
was, quite broadly, nature (phusis)—as evidenced, I believe, in 1.2—and that the number 
and nature of the principles is filled in by book 1.   
Now in 2.1, we get Aristotle’s famous definition (horismos) of nature: “Nature is a 
sort of principle (arche) and cause (aition) of change and remaining unchanged in that to 
which it belongs primarily of itself, that is, not by virtue of concurrence” (192b20-23).  
Notice that in this very definition—what Aristotle told us would divide the whole into 
particulars—we get mention of a principle (arche). Now, on my reading, precisely why 
Aristotle does this (and why book 2 follows book 1) is because Aristotle needed to start 
formulating his definition for the uninterpreted whole (phusis) by first getting clear on what 
sort of thing a principle is (the work of book 1). Somewhat more obscurely, I think that 
Aristotle, in his discussion of causes, beginning in 2.3 and ending in 2.7, fills in the remaining 
work about how a thing is said to be natural (and so “divided into particulars” in four different 
ways). 
                                                          
24 See Ross 5-6.  Simplicius 801.13 (Ross 6). 





At this point I think we may safely summarize my approach (what I call the “physical” 
approach to the methodology presented in Physics 1.1) and list its advantages over what I 
have called the “dialectical” and “scientific” approaches.   
On my reading, the main thread of argument in Physics books 1 and 2 is dominated 
by the methodology discussed in Physics 1.1 (not present somewhere else in the Aristotelian 
corpus), and so follows the general structure demanded by Aristotle’s insistence that 
knowledge results from a definition (horismos) which takes a universal/whole (katholou, 
holon), more knowable and more clear to us by perception (ten aisthesin), and divides it 
(diairei) by means of principles (archai) into particulars which are clearer and more 
knowable by nature (phusei). This structure, reinforced by certain elements of the discussion 
of Physics 1 and 2 I have mentioned, demands that we start with a universal (which I have 
identified in the Physics as phusis itself) and that we get clear on the principles needed to 
divide this universal. This of course is borne out in the actual structure of Physics 1 and 2. 
The definition comes later at 2.1, after principles for the definition have been adequately 
discussed and numbered. 
We now see that the physical approach is neither dialectical nor scientific. The 
dialectical interpretation emphasizes Aristotle’s moving from what is more clear to what is 
less clear (as in the Topics) and the certain bits of supposed ordinary linguistic data in the 
Physics. But on the physical reading we are meant to start with wholes (katholou/holon) more 
known to us by sense perception, and arrive at what is less clear to us, but what is, 
importantly, clearer by nature.  In this way the physical reading resists the identification of 
Aristotle’s method in the Physics with that of the Topics. Indeed, it seems to be the point of 
much of Physics 1 to show the dangers of dialectic that begins not with a universal known 
from sense perception but from supposed endoxa (viz., the errors of the monists described in 
Physics 1.2-4). 
The scientific interpretation, on the other hand, wants to draw a direct equivalence 
between the method described in Physics 1.1 and that of the Posterior Analytics. The physical 
interpretation resists this move as well. The Posterior Analytics states emphatically that the 
particulars are better known than the wholes/universals, whereas the Physics states the 
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opposite. The physical interpretation does not try to explain away this tension, but rather 
reaffirms the whole/universal (phusis), gathered from the very sense perception that a natural 
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